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The paper “International Reserves and Underdeveloped Capital Mar-
kets” by Kathryn M. E. Dominguez sheds light on an important puzzle
thathasappearedintheendofthe1990s,namely,theveryhighgrowthof
international reserves held by emerging markets. Figure 1 below shows
thatthemostdramaticincreasehastakenplaceinAsianandMiddleEast
emerging markets. Up to the beginning of 2009, it appears that the finan-
cial crisishas reduced reserves in Latin America and emerging European
countries but not in Asian and Middle East emerging markets. The puz-
zle is still here.
The paperanalyzes the role offinancialdevelopment in this story. This
is certainly a complex role depending on the nature of financial develop-
ment and its interaction with other variables. In this paper, reserves are
interpreted as a possible response by authorities to a problem of sub-
optimally low private insurance due to financial constraints on borrow-
ing. Reserves in this paper are viewed as a way to counteract the relative
underdevelopment of financial markets. The problem of private under-
insurance against potential capital shortfalls (sudden stops) and the role
of reserves as a potential mitigating answer have been analyzed by
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) and Caballero and Panageas
(2007), on which the theoretical reasoning in this paper is based. In these
models, for reserve accumulation (the purchase of foreign bonds) to alle-
viate the problem of private underinsurance, its effect on the home
money supply must be sterilized by issuing domestic bonds with high
interest rates. The government is essentially subsidizing savings to miti-
gate the problem of private underinsurance.
First note that the role of financial development in explaining reserves
asaresponsetoprivateunderinsuranceagainstsuddenstopsisnecessar-
ily nonlinear. At one extreme, with complete financial markets, there is
no reason that public authorities intervene and subsidize private saving.
At the other extreme, if the country is completely closed to financial
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suddenstops.Hence,inthecontextofthispaper,reserveaccumulationis
apolicythatmusttakeplaceinsituationsofintermediatefinancialdevel-
opment. This is broadly consistent with the stylized fact that reserve
growth has been highest among emerging markets.
Note also that the distinction between the precautionary motive and
the financial underdevelopment motive on which the paper focuses is
not clear‐cut. The first stems from the desire to smooth consumption dis-
tortions intertemporally in the face of sudden reversals of international
capital inflows. The second, at least as analyzed by Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2001) and Caballero and Panageas (2007), stems from
the desire to subsidize suboptimally low private saving to insure against
Fig. 1. Reserve accumulation by emerging countries. Source International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics 2009, index: 2000 = 100.
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motive looks very much like a precautionary one too, and in fact
CaballeroandPanageas(2007)useforreservesthetermofprecautionary
resources. In a sense, financial underdevelopment in the form of domes-
tic financial constraints increases the need for reserves that help increase
private precautionary saving. The s t o r yt e s t e di nt h i sp a p e ri so n ei n
which reserves are a very indirect instrument for the ultimate objective,
which is to subsidize firms’ precautionary saving through a high interest
rate. Itisnot completely clearwhysomemoredirect policyof subsidyon
saving is not possible. This may be linked to the development of the fi-
nancial system, and it would be interesting to better understand this is-
sue on the choice of policy instrument.
The paper can also be seen as a counterargument to Obstfeld,
Shambaugh, and Taylor (2008, 2009). In these papers, higher domestic
financial development implies that the stakes in case of a financial crisis
are higher and the consequences more dramatic. A larger banking sector
(proxied by a higher M2/GDP) and a higher level of financial openness
require more insurance against a bank run becoming a balance of pay-
ment crisis. In their reasoning, optimal reserves increase with the size of
the banking sector and with financial openness.
In the story tested in this paper, as well as in Caballero and Krishna-
murthy (2001) on which it is based, the roles of financial openness and
domestic financial development are quite different. It is the combination
of financial openness and domestic financial constraints that generates
the private underinsurance problem, which in turn leads authorities to
accumulate reserves. From this point of view, the empirical analysis is
a bitdisconnectedfromthe theorysince financialopennessanddomestic
financialdevelopment are interpretedsimilarly.To betterunderstandthe
determinants of reserve accumulation, it would be useful to derive the-
oretically the optimal level of reserves as a function of both domestic fi-
nancialconstraintsandfinancialopenness.Thesetwoshouldhaveavery
different impact. In the empirics, one of the measures of domestic finan-
cial development is the ratio of external liabilities (portfolio equity and
debt liabilities) to GDP. This looks more like a measure of financial open-
nessthanofdomesticfinancialdevelopment.Itisalsonotclearwhyfora
measure of financial development only liabilities and not assets are in-
cluded. The two other measures of financial development are closer to
the tested story.
The results suggest that the role of financial development and open-
ness in reserve accumulation is indeed complex. Capital controls that neg-
atively affect financial openness do not have a robust impact on reserve
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mentintheformofahigherratioofM2toGDPincreasesaccumulationof
reserves. However, controlling for this measure of financial develop-
ment, higher financial development in the form of private credit and
stock market capitalization to GDP is correlated to a decrease in reserve
accumulation. One interpretation is the one given in the paper, although
my reading of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) would lead me to
add an interaction term between financial openness and domestic finan-
cial development. Again, I would expect that it is the combination of fi-
nancial openness (which makes sudden stops possible) and financial
domestic underdevelopment (which increases the economic cost of these
sudden stops) that leads to reserve accumulation. From this point of
view, there is a clear connection with some of the analysis of Caballero,
Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008).
If one believes in the interpretation pushed in the paper, some interest-
ing implications emerge. First, reserve accumulation by emerging coun-
tries should be a temporary phenom e n o na st h e s ec o u n t r i e sd e v e l o p
domestic financial markets. The global imbalances that can at least be
partially linked to reserve accumulation by emerging markets should
therefore also be a temporary phenomenon. The analysis of the political
economy of financial development can also be informed by such results.
One puzzle that emerges from this paper is that it implies that govern-
ments find it easier to insure against some economic costs of sudden
stops through reserve accumulation rather than through domestic finan-
cial development.
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